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1. INTRODUCTION
"[T]his is really, really flucking brilliant. Really, really great,"
exclaimed U2 front man Bono during his acceptance speech for "Best
Original Song" at the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, resulting in a deluge of
complaints to the FCC.! In response, the FCC's Enforcement Bureau issued
a Memorandum Opinion and Order finding that "[tlhe word 'flicking' may
be crude and offensive, but, in the context presented here, [it] did not
describe sexual or excretory organs or activities., The bureau further
mentioned, "when offensive language is used as an adjective to emphasize
an exclamation . .. or it is used as an insult . . .. then it falls beyond the
scope of the indecency regime."
Upset with the decision, a group of people affiliated with the Parents
Television Council (PTC) pressured the FCC until the agency finally
agreed to revisit the bureau's prior decision.4 In a Memorandum Opinion
and Order released on March 18, 2004, the FCC departed from its prior
position and promulgated a new policy concerning the fleeting-or
nondeliberate, nonrepetitive, and otherwise isolated-use of expletives on

1. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 451 (2d Cir. 2007).
2. Complaints Against Various Brdcst. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859,
para. 5 (2003) [hereinafter Golden Globe Order], rev'd, Memorandum Opinion and Order,

19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004).
3. Dave E. Hutchinson, Note, "Fleeting Expletives" Are the Tip of the Iceberg:
Falloutfrom Exposing the Arbitrary and Capricious Nature of Indecency Regulation, 61
FED. Comm. L.J. 229, 245 (2008) (citing Golden Globe Order, supra note 2, at para. 5)
(citation omitted).
4. See id.
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public airwaves.' Although the Order indicated that it would be
inappropriate to punish NBC in this case since the network did not have
adequate notice of the new policy, the FCC was clear that the fleeting or
incidental use of expletives would be subject to punishment in the future.6
As a result, a number of broadcast networks sought legal reprieve in
Circuit, arguing that the new policy was both arbitrary and
Second
the
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.7 In an opinion by Judge
Rosemary S. Pooler, writing on behalf of a three-judge panel, the Second
Circuit agreed that the new policy was arbitrary and capricious, but opted
to bypass the constitutional question for the time being.8 The FCC
subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and on March 17,
2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 9
In a somewhat surprising opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit. Like the
Second Circuit, however, the Supreme Court did not address the First
Amendment issue underlying the FCC' s policy, and instead based its
decision on the premise that the policy was "entirely rational" and therefore
neither arbitrary nor capricious.' 0
Despite the Court's opinion, the controversy surrounding the use and
regulation of expletives on the public airwaves was not dead. Not too long
ago, in fact, the issue made headlines following the September 26, 2009,
season debut of Saturday Night Live, during which one of the comedians,
Jenny Slate, inadvertently said the word "flucking" as opposed to the word
"freaking," in a planned skit."' Even more recently, on July 13, 2010, the
Second Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court, determined that the
FCC's policy concerning fleeting expletives is unconstitutional in violation
2
of the First Amendment.'1
With national attention again focused on the issue of fleeting
expletives, it has become worthwhile to evaluate the Supreme Court's
decision in Federal Communications Commission v. Fox to determine what
5. See Complaints Against Various Brdcst. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975,
para. 12 (2004).
6. See id. at paras. 12-15.
7. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454-55 (2d Cir. 2007).
8. See id.
9. Lyle Denniston, Court Grants Review of Indecency Law, 7 Other Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG

(Mar. 17, 2008, 10:02 AM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2008/03/court-

grants-review-of-indecency-law!.
10. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812 (2009).
11. Saturday Night Live (NBC television broadcast Sept. 26, 2009).
12. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 335 (2d Cir. 2010).
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led to the result in that case. It is also important to consider what might
happen now that Sonia Sotomayor has replaced David Souter and Elena
Kagan has replaced John Paul Stevens. After considering four prevailing
models of judicial decision making, this Note contends that Supreme Court
Justices decide cases predominately in accordance with their judicial
attitudes and personal ideologies. Consequently, based on the ostensible
attitudes of the current Justices, if the Court soon addresses the First
Amendment issue, it seems that the outcome will likely favor the
broadcasters.
This Note begins in Part 11 by discussing in more depth the decisions
by the Second Circuit as well as the decision by the Supreme Court. Part III
of this Note evaluates the four leading models of judicial decision
making-the legal model, the attitudinal model, the strategic model, and
the historic-institution model-and posits that the attitudinal model has
achieved the greatest record of success when it comes to predicting and
explaining the outcome of various cases. Part IV applies these four models
to the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Communications Commission
v. Fox, concluding ultimately that the attitudinal model provides the most
coherent explanation for the outcome, and thereby leading to the
implication that the result of a future fleeting-expletives case hinges mostly
on the composition of the Court. Part V then sets up a prediction for how
the fleeting expletives issue will ultimately be resolved by considering the
judicial attitudes of recent appointee Sonia Sotomayor as well as the
apparent attitudes of the remaining Justices, including the recently
confirmed Elena Kagan. The Note generally concludes that if a First
Amendment challenge surfaces before the Court, the Court will most likely
invalidate the FCC's current policy, paving the way for a new era in the
regulation of broadcast media.

11. THE CASE: FEDERAL COMMNCATIONS COMMJSSION v Fox
After the FCC came out with its new policy governing the use of
fleeting expletives, Fox Television Stations, along with CBS, WLS, KRTK,
KMBC, and ABC, appealed to the Second Circuit, asking the court to
consider whether the policy was legally justified.'12 A number of other
parties, including NBC, FBC, and the Center for the Creative Community,
joined as intervenors. 13 Although the impetus for the FCC's policy change
was the controversy surrounding the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, the facts
that gave rise to the case involved four particular broadcasts that were
allegedly indecent, albeit retroactively, under. the Golden Globe Order.
The first was Fox's broadcast of the 2002 Billboard Music Awards.
12. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 452.
13. Id. at 454.
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Similar to the events of the Golden Globes, musician Cher caught Fox off
guard during an acceptance speech when she said, "People have been
telling me I'm on the way out every year, right? So fuck 'em."'14 The
second was at the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, where one of the show's
presenters, Nicole Richie, rhetorically inquired, "[h]ave you ever tried to
get cow shit out of a Prada purse?" and then retorted, "[i]t's not so flucking
simple."' The third involved a series of broadcasts of ABC's NYPD Blue,
in which one of the characters, Detective Andy Sipowicz, used the words
"bullshit," "dick," and "dickhead." 16 The last concerned a broadcast of
CBS's Early Show in which one of the contestants on the show Survivor
7
called another contestant a "bullshitter." 1
Shortly after the case was filed, the FCC moved for a voluntary
remand to give the FCC a chance to address petitioners' arguments."8 The
FCC then issued its Remand Order,'9 which replaced the Golden Globe
Order but reaffirmed the FCC's finding that the 2002 and 2003 Billboard
Music Award broadcasts were indecent and profane, meaning that the
broadcasts depicted or described sexual or excretory activities .2 The
Remand Order reversed the decision against the Early Show, finding it to
be a bona fide news program and dismissed the claim against NYPD Blue
on the basis that the questionable language occurred during the safe harbor
time period .2 ' Fox then moved for review of the Remand Order and filed a
motion to consolidate that appeal with the one already before the court.2
On appeal, Fox and the other petitioners raised several arguments, but
because the court agreed with Fox that the FCC's policy was arbitrary and
capricious, it went no further in its analysis. When evaluating an agency
decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard, courts typically
require the agency to examine the pertinent facts and provide a satisfactory
explanation for its action. As the Second Circuit indicated, there must be a
"Crational connection between the facts found and the choice made."" This
review is narrow, and it is not the job of the court to substitute its judgment

14. Id. at 452.
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 453.
19. See Complaints Regarding Various TV Brdcsts. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8,
2005, Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, para. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Remand Order].
20. Id.
21. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 453-54; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999(b) (2010)
(describing the safe-harbor time period as the hours between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.).
22. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 454.
23. Id. at 455 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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for that of the agency.2
Using this framework, the Second Circuit found that the FCC's policy
was arbitrary and capricious because it represented a complete shift from
previous policy, the reason for which was unclear. 25 Prior to 2003, for
example, the "FCC had consistently taken the view that isolated, nonliteral, fleeting expletives did not run afoul of its indecency reim.,26
Recognizing as much, the FCC agreed that it was making a change, saying
"[iln the Golden Globe Order, the Commission made clear that it was
changing course with respect to the treatment of isolated expletives."2
The court then determined that the FCC's justifications for departing
from its prior rulings were inadequate. As the court mentioned, "[a]gencies
are of course free to revise their rules and policies. Such a change,
however, must provide a reasoned analysis for departing from prior
precedent." 28 Attempting to provide such a reasoned analysis, the
Commission relied primarily on the Supreme Court's opinion in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation.9 In that case, the
Court was persuaded that material on public airwaves enters the home
without warning, and wrote, "[tlo say that one may avoid further offense by
turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow."3 0
The Second Circuit rejected this justification because it failed to
explain why fleeting expletives suddenly amounted to a "first blow" when
they never did in the past."1 The court also stated that the policy was not
appropriately tailored under the first blow theory because there were
certain exceptions that would allow the same words to be used in one
context but not another. A broadcaster could, for example, air a taping of
the oral argument in this case, during which the same offensive expletives
were routinely used, on the basis that in such a context, the airing would
have journalistic or artistic importance.3 Likewise, a broadcaster also
could air an unedited version of the movie Saving PrivateRyan because the
expletives are integral to the work and deleting them would have
diminished the realism and effect of the movie.3 Because of such
24. Idat 455.
25. Id.
2 6. Id
27. Brief of Respondent at 33, Fox TV Stations v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2007) (Nos. 061760-ag, 06-2750-ag, 06-5358-ag), 2006 WL 5486967 at *33.
28. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 456 (citations omitted).
29. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
30. Id. at 748-49.
31. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 458.
32. Id.
33. Id at 458-59 (citing Complaints Against Various TV Licensees Regarding Their
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exceptions, unwilling viewers or listeners would still be subject to the first
blow, the court reasoned.3 As a result, the Second Circuit found the new
policy to be arbitrary and capricious.
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision by a five-

to-four vote, finding that the policy was neither arbitrary nor

capricious."5

Justice Scalia announced the opinion of the Court, which was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. There
were seven opinions altogether, as Justice Scalia lost a majority for Part IIIE of his opinion.3 The majority opinion rejected the Second Circuit's
application of what it called a heightened--or more searching-arbitrary
and capricious review standard.3 More importantly, the Court mentioned
that the Second Circuit erred by requiring the FCC to provide a more
satisfactory justification for the change in policy than that which was
required to adopt the original policy in the first place.3
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by
Justice Kennedy, in which he agreed with the result based on the
Administrative Procedure Act, but questioned the validity of the Court's
precedent concerning the regulation of broadcast media.3 Justice Kennedy
filed a separate concurring opinion that repeated the Second Circuit's legal
standard, but found that the FCC had not failed to provide a reasoned
explanation for its policy change .4 0 By contrast, Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion suggested that the FCC, in fact, did fail to explain its
policy change.4 Justice Ginsburg filed a separate dissenting opinion
forecasting the ramifications of the new policy on the First Amendment.4
The lead dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, found not only that the FCC had
failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its change in policy but also
that it had failed to identify the underlying circumstances necessitating
Broadcast on Nov. 11, 2004, of the ABC TV Network's Presentation of the Film "Saving
Private Ryan," Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, para. 14 (2005)).
34. Id. at 459.
35. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
36. As this case illustrates, the Court has departed from a time in which the consensual
norm of the Justices was to issue unanimous opinions. The reason for this departure, some
scholars contend, is that dissenting and concurring opinions provide a mechanism for the
Court to increase its power and legal control over society in light of the contentious cases
the Court now hears. See M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back
Again: A Theory ofDissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REv. 283, 286-87 (2007).
37. See FCC v. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 18 10.
38. Id
39. Id. at 1819-20 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. Id at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 1829 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

268

26

~FEDERAL
COMM4UNICATIONS LA

[o.663
[Vol.

W JOURNAL

change to begin with.4
Like the decision from the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court's
decision did not address the underlying First Amendment issue. Justice
Scalia asserted, "[ilf the Commission's action here was not arbitrary or
capricious in the ordinary sense, it satisfies the Administrative Procedure
Act's 'arbitrary [or] capricious' standard; its lawfulness under the
Constitution is a separate question to be addressed in a constitutional
challenge.""4 Because of the Supreme Court's role as final arbiter and not
first reviewer, Scalia unsurprisingly saw no reason to "abandon . .. usual
procedures in a rush to judgment without a lower court opinion [addressing
the constitutional question].~
Thus, while this case focused solely on whether the FCC's policy was
arbitrary and capricious and not on whether the policy was constitutional, it
seems likely that the Court will need to decide the First Amendment issue
at some point. Indeed, given the Second Circuit's recent remand decision
finding the FCs policy to be unconstitutionally vague in violation of the
First Amendment, it has become even more necessary for the Supreme
Court to finally resolve the constitutional issue.4 After evaluating four
primary models of judicial decision making, this Note contends that if the
Court addresses the First Amendment issue, the attitudes of the justices will
lead to a result that favors the broadcasters.
111. FOUR MODELS OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING

A.

The Legal Model

Probably the most easily identifiable model of judicial decision
making is the legal model. The legal model posits that judges base
decisions solely in accordance with the law, which is developed primarily
by previous cases and the canons of statutory interpretation.4 As Chief
Justice John Roberts famously quipped during his confirmation hearing,
"Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around.
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them.
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody
plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.""8
43.
44.
45.
46.

See FCC v. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1812.
Id. at 1819.
Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010).
47. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
ATTLJDINAL MODEL

COURT AND THE

32 (1993).

48. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee).
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Although the legal model is based upon the notion that judges and
Justices are neutral umpires, Harold J. Spaeth identifies four major tools or
methods of analysis that legalists often employ. The first looks only at the
plain meaning of the text. This method "simply holds that judges rest their
decisions on the plain meaning of the pertinent language,',49 which applies
to not only statutes and constitutional provisions, but also to the Justices'
own judicially created rules.5 0 The problem, though, is that the plain
meaning is often indeterminate, which in many cases renders this tool
unhelpful to judicial decision makers.
If the text is not readily ascertainable, the second guiding tool
available to legalists is the legislative and framers' intent. As Spaeth
mentions, "[flegislative and framers' intent refers to construing statutes and
the Constitution according to the preferences of those who originally
drafted and supported them.""' Virtually any information that can be
elicited from the historical record preceding the enactment is available for
consideration.5 Thus, this method can sometimes provide more guidance
to the Justices when the plain meaning is unclear.5 Yet, in many cases, it is
nearly impossible to determine what motivated a legislator to vote the way
he or she did, despite what the legislative history may reveal.
A third method of legalistic analysis focuses heavily on case
precedent. This method is perhaps observed most commonly, since nearly
every case cites to precedent as a way to help justify the outcome.514 When
statutory or constitutional language is unclear, judges consider how
previous judges have interpreted the text, with a goal of guaranteeing some
consistency in the application of the law. One unfortunate characteristic of
precedent, though, is that ambiguous text, by its nature, can often be
interpreted in more than one way, leading to the result that precedent does
not always provide clear guidance to judges seeking to apply the law."5
The fourth and final method or analytical tool that judges might
employ is a form of balancing that weighs the collective interest or public
good on one side against the individual interests at stake on the other.
Balancing can be either ad hoc (done on a case-by-case basis) or
definitional (where the court "employs one or more hard-and-fast rules to
49. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 47, at 34.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 38.
52. See id at 3 8-40.
53. The most useful elements of legislative intent include, in order of importance,
committee reports, bills and their amendments, sponsor remarks, and committee hearings.

See Peggy Jarrett & Cheryl Nyberg, Introduction,

FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE

http://lib.law.washington.edu/ref/fedlegishist.html (last visited Nov. 12, 20 10).

54. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 47, at 44.
55. See id. at 44-45.

HISTORY,
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rationalize a decision."). 56 Naturally, ad hoc balancing gives judges more
leeway to evaluate the facts of a particular case without reference to prior
rules or tests.5 Despite its inherent subjectivity, Spaeth notes, "justices
commonly label [balancing] an objective criterion," thereby fitting it nicely
58
within the legal model of judicial decision making. 1
Probably the greatest appeal of the legal model is that it comports
with the perception of the Court as an independent and impartial branch of
government that makes black-and-white decisions based purely on the law.
In many situations, especially situations in which the statutory language is
unequivocal or the case precedent is obviously one-sided, the legal model
is an effective tool for explaining the Court's decisions. When the Court
experiences new questions of law and changing social attitudes, however,
the legal model continually reveals its shortcomings.5

B.

The Attitudinal Model

The most widely accepted model of judicial decision making by
scholars and legal analysts is the attitudinal model. The attitudinal model
varies markedly from the legal model. Justices often discredit its validity as
a way to explain the outcome of their cases .60 As Spaeth nevertheless
suggests, the attitudinal model presumes that the 'justices decide .. , cases
on the basis of the interaction of their ideological attitudes and values with
the facts of a case. . .. In other words, the justices vote as they do because
they want their decisions to reflect their individual personal policy
preferences." 6
There are two basic iterations of the attitudinal model.6 The first
evaluates the behavior of justices in very narrowly defined issues-that is,
how justices react to specific issues such as the death penalty, commercial
speech, or affirmative action.6 The second iteration analyzes the behavior
of Justices in much broader terms.64 Under this broader view, one might
evaluate how Justices tend to vote on issues generally falling under the
5 6. Id at 5 2.

57. See id. at 53.
58. Id. at n.82.
59. See KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 11 (1992) (arguing that "any
extreme thesis that 'the law' is always or usually indeterminate is untenable."); see also
RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: L/EGITMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1 (1998) (suggesting that there are "internally-correct
[sic] answers to all legal-rights questions.")./

60. Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296, 306 (Lee
Epstein, ed. 1995).

61. Id.at305.
62. Id
63. Id.
64. Id
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umbrella of civil rights or business regulation.6
Although the attitudinal model seems to be widely accepted by many
people, there is still some disagreement among scholars on the source of
attitudes. The debate generally revolves around "whether an individual
acquires [his or her attitudes] genetically or as a result of environmental
experience-and whether the justices' personal policy preferences extend
to normative considerations, such as judicial restraint and strict
construction, or to procedural matters, such as venue and mootness, or
operate only substantively." 66 Despite this apparent source of disagreement,
however, Spaeth posits that any differences in the origins of attitudes do
not affect the underlying assumptions of the attitudinal model and only
direct the focus of the analyst.6
Spaeth's formulation of the attitudinal model describes the Justices in
terms of their political ideology. Justices are therefore categorized as being
either liberal, moderate, or conservative as identified first by the Justices'
prior voting record, and second, if no such record exists, by newspaper
editorials that classify the nominees before their confirmation as liberal or
conservative on issues of civil rights and civil liberties .68 Spaeth then uses
Guttman scaling to predict the outcome of certain cases. This method is
cumulative in nature, meaning it "assumes that persons who respond
favorably to a given question will also respond favorably to all less extreme
questions."6
Using that analysis, Spaeth considered the issue of capital punishment
and found a remarkably consistent voting pattern of the Justices, such that
the most liberal justice consistently supported the person subject to capital
punishment and the most conservative Justice consistently voted to uphold
the death sentence .70 The remaining Justices fell somewhere in the middle
along a continuum of ideological preferences. The pattern continued for
each of the nine Justices, seemingly demonstrating a clear correlation
between the Justices' personal ideologies and their voting patterns.7 Other
scholars have found that, in various appellate courts, liberal panels issue a
liberal ruling well over half of the time, while conservative panels reach a
liberal result well under half of the time.7 As a result, it is evident that the
attitudinal model is often capable of providing useful insight into the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 305-06.
Id.
Id. at3l10.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Idat 309.
See Cass R. Sunstemn, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Eliman, Ideological Voting

on Federal Courts of Appeals, 90

VA. L. Rrv.

301, 306 (2004).

27
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA

272

WJOURNAL

[Vol.
[o.663

outcome of cases.

C

The StrategicModel

There are many similarities between the strategic model and the
attitudinal model. Most importantly, both models recognize that 'justices,
first and foremost, wish to see their policy preferences etched into law.
They are, in the opinion of many, 'single-minded seekers of legal
policy."' 7 3

The strategic account purports to go further, though, claiming

that while the Justices are indeed motivated by their own individual policy
preferences, they are not unconstrained actors who base decisions
exclusively on their own ideological attitudes. "Rather, justices are
strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends
on a consideration of the preferences of other actors, the choices they
74
expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act."1
In The Choices Justices Make, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight identify
the major components of the strategic model. The first is that Justices are
driven by a desire to effectuate their individual goals.7 Epstein and Knight
suggest that the Justices' decisions can be explained by the rational choice
paradigm, which assumes that the Justices are rational actors. Rational
actors presumptively make rational decisions, based on the belief that such
a course of action will most likely advance his or her goals.7 But even
proponents of the strategic model recognize that a Justice's goals often
reflect his or her attitudes, raising questions about whether seemingly
strategic behavior is more likely just a reflection of the attitudinal model at
77
work.
The second major component of the strategic account is strategic
interaction. This component embodies the principle that if Justices want to
materialize their policy preferences, they have to act strategically in making
their choices.7 Epstein and Knight describe this phenomenon as
interdependent decision making. A strategic Justice knows, for example,
that the maximization of his or her policy preferences is dependent upon
the preferences and expected actions of the other Justices, which are in turn
dependent upon their individual preferences.7
The last component of the strategic account addresses the role of
73. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-10 (1998) (quoting
Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86
Am. POL. SCI. R. 325 (1992)).
74. Id. at 10.
75. Id at 10-11.
76. Id. at 11.
77. See generally id.
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id.
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institutions as it relates to judicial decision making. Epstein and Knight
indicate that institutions can be "formal, such as laws, or informal, such as
norms and conventions."80 To elucidate the role of institutions more
clearly, Epstein and Knight discuss the processes governing the creation of
precedent. Because the Court must issue a majority opinion-that is, one
that is signed by at least five Justices-in order for the opinion to "become
law of the land," 8' the Justices are sometimes forced to pursue their policy
goals in somewhat unconventional ways.
In Craig v. Boren'82 a case about gender-based equal protection, the
Court adopted an intermediate standard of review that is less stringent than
strict scrutiny but more stringent than rational basis review.8 Epstein and
Knight suggest that the Court took this approach because at least five of the
Justices wanted gender-based equal protection claims to be subject to
heightened review, but because the Court could not command a majority
for strict scrutiny, it had to develop an intermediate test.84 Epstein and
Knight also highlight how the "good behavior" provision in Article III of
the Constitution 85 affects or influences the Justices' actions. For example,
since many people believe that Justices are accorded life tenure barring any
egregious ethical or criminal violations, Epstein and Knight contend that
the Justices are, by virtue of the institution in which they work, relatively
free to focus their energy on satisfying their policy preferences. 86
Altogether, it is evident that the strategic account of judicial decision
making can sometimes explain the Justices' behavior. But because the
strategic model works only on the assumption that Justices are motivated
by individual goals, which often implicate their individual ideologies or
personal attitudes, it is, in many cases, difficult to divorce strategic
behavior from the attitudes that actually inform that behavior in the first
place.
D.

The Historic-InstitutionModel

Historic institutionalists agree with proponents of the strategic model
to the extent that the model holds that Justices are somewhat motivated by
the institutional norms and customs of the political branch in which they
87
work . But institutionalists suggest that the strategic account does not go
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 17.
Id.
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
See id.

84. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 73, at 17.
85. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.").
86. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 73, at 17.
87. Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive
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far enough. To put it simply, institutionalists contend that the Justices are
influenced predominately by their role in deciding actual cases and the
mission of the Court as a separate branch of government. 8
Historic institutionalists; begin their analysis by uncovering the socalled mission of the Court .89 As Howard Gillman indicates, the first step
toward uncovering the Court's mission is to review the foundational
documents, such as Article III of the Constitution, which identify the
Court's job description.9" In line with Article 111, Gillman says that there is
"evidence that most justices act in accordance with the Court's formal
responsibility to decide actual legal disputes based on their best
understanding of law." 9 ' Yet, historic institutionalists understand that the
foundational documents do not paint the entire picture, as Justices often are
motivated by different goals, such as preserving the political system as a
92
whole or preserving the Court's institutional legitimacy.
In fact, there are a number of organizational or contextual factors that
influence judicial decision making including:
the Court's relationship to a central government in a federal system,
the fact that decisions are made by a majority of a small group of
people, the elaborate (and changing) norms governing justiciability and
the authority of stare decisis, the creation of intermediate courts of
appeals, the expansion of the Court's constitutional and statutory

jurisdiction, the elimination of mandatory appeals, the Rule of Four,
the hiring of law clerks, the secrecy of the conference, the ability to
print and circulate drafts of opinions, even the move to the so-called
Marble Temple in 1935.~
It is within the context of these various factors that the Justices make
their decisions. As Gillman notes, it is unlikely that the institutional
characteristics of the Court influence the judges' and Justices' behavior
only so far as those characteristics channel or constrain the judges' and
Justices' individual policy interests .94 "While it is true that life tenure might
make it easier to promote policy preferences, it may also be central to a
judge's sense of duty to resist political pressure and decide a case in
accordance with the law."9 5 If one understands the institutional
characteristics of the Court as stemming from "a concern about the
Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT
D)ECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65-67 (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
88. See id.
89. See id at 78-80.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 80.
Id.
Id. at81.

Gillman, supra note 87, at 82.
94. Idat 83.
95. Id.
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accomplishment of substantive concerns and functions" (i.e., the Court's
mission), and also understands that preserving those functions is central to
the identity of the Court as an institution, the Court's ability to accomplish
goals beyond the Justices' individual policy interests becomes clear.9
Historic institutionalists argue that the Justices of the Court "should
be expected to deliberate about protecting their institution's legitimacy and
(relatedly) adapting their institution's mission to changing contexts and the
actions of other institutions." 97 Gillman explains that the Justices
consciously avoid self-inflicted wounds that can discredit the Court's
supposed role as an independent and impartial branch of government as
opposed to a policymnaking body. 98 According to Gillman, it is this
conscious attempt to avoid undermining the Court's reputation as an
independent branch of government that informs the Justices' behavior in
many cases. For example, Gillman suggests that the Justices' recognition of
the importance of maintaining the Court's institutional legitimacy led the
Court to develop a unanimous front in Brown v. Board of Education."9
Observing that proponents of the strategic model would label such actions
as clear examples of strategic behavior, Gillman contends that the
difference is that the Court was motivated by an altruistic desire to preserve
the legitimacy of the Court as an institution rather than the Justices' desire
to maximize their individual policy preferences.' 00

IV. ExPLAINING FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION V
Fox IN TERMS OF THE FOuR DOMINANT MODELS OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING
Although it is clear that each of the four models of judicial decision
making has useful tenets that can sometimes assist one's understanding of
the outcome of certain cases, the attitudinal model boasts the greatest
record of success and overall capability for explaining how Justices act and
predicting how they will decide cases. Not surprisingly, the attitudinal
model best explains the Justices' actions leading to the outcome of Federal
Communications Commission v. Fox. The other models, for one reason or
another, succumbed to their inherent weaknesses and failed to provide
necessary insight into the Justices' behavior.

97. Id.
98. Id. at8 1.
99. Id
99. Id. (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
10 0. Id.
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A. The Shortcomings of the Legal Model andHistoric-Institutional
Model
This section begins by considering the legal model and the historicinstitutional model and demonstrating ways in which these two models
were unable to explain the Supreme Court's decision. Since this section
argues that the legal model and historic-institutional model cannot explain
the decision in hindsight, it seems to follow that these models cannot
satisfactorily predict the outcome of a future fleeting expletives case.
The Legal Model-A Beacon of Unsophistication
The difficulty with the legal model is that it fails to explain how the
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court reached diametrically opposite
results. The arbitrary and capricious standard is by its nature subject to
differing applications. Pursuant to Motor Vehicle Manufacturers'.
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile. Insurance Co. ,10 for
example, the Court could have found that because the FCC failed to
provide an adequate factual basis for its finding that fleeting expletives are
indecent, it likewise failed to demonstrate a rational connection between
the policy change and the reasons supporting that policy change.'0 2 Relying
on the same precedent, the Court also could have found (as it ultimately
did) that the FCC's action was neither arbitrary nor capricious on the basis
that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.'O
Since it seems that the Court could have found either way based on its own
precedent, the inquiry then becomes one of determining what underlying
motivations actually influenced the Justices in their decision. The legal
model does not satisfactorily address that inquiry.
Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court's opinion, some scholars
suggest that the Second Circuit's decision was the right one. As Justin
Winquist notes, "[c]onsidering the variability with which arbitrary and
capricious review has been applied .. . the [Second Circuit's] decision was
not blatantly erroneous."'04That the standard has been applied differently
in the first place suggests the legal model is ill-equipped to explain the
differences in opinion regarding arbitrary and capricious review. Moreover,
the Supreme Court's reversal of the Second Circuit decision when the
decision was not "blatantly erroneous" indicates that something more than
pure legal analysis guided the Supreme Court's decision. Hutchinson says,
1.

101. 463U.S.at46.
102. See Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 240.
103. Id. at 241.
104. Justin Winquist, Note, Arbitrary and F^@4#$*! Capricious: An Analysis of the
Second Circuit's Rejection of the FCC's Fleeting Expletive Regulation in Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC (2007), 57 Am. U. L. Ray. 723, 736-37 (2007) (citations omitted).
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"[o]f course, the manner in which the arbitrary and capricious review is
employed depends not only on the composition of the Court, but also on
the facts of the particular case." 0 One would not expect pure legal analysis
to vary regardless of who occupies the seats on the bench, and as a result,
the legal model fails to explain the outcome of Federal Communications
Commission v. Fox.
2. The Historic-Institutional Model-Unrealistic and Fatally
Flawed?
The historic-institutional model similarly fails to explain the outcome
of the case. Although it is perhaps true that institutional characteristics
define the contours of the Justices' decisions, it seems implausible that the
Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Fox would not have
reached the same decision were it not for those institutional characteristics.
It is difficult to comprehend the Court's decision if one assumes that it was
primarily informed by the Court's role within the United States' political
system. While one might argue that the Court, given the ground swell of
public opinion against fleeting expletives, was trying to maintain its
institutional prestige as a socially responsive organization, the vast majority
of complaints directed to the FCC stemmed from only one organization: the
PTC. 106 The Court has always held that the tendency of speech to offend
does not determine its permissibility, especially when the offense is
confined to a limited segment of society. 17Because nearly all of the
complaints here were tied to one organization, it seems unlikely that the
Court was concerned with its reputation as a socially responsive institution.
Thus, when one considers the competing claims that Justices make
decisions in an effort to maximize their policy preferences, as opposed to
the claim that Justices are altruistic actors seeking to preserve the
legitimacy of the Court as an institution, the former seems more tenable.
That is not to say that some of the organizational attributes that
Gillman identified could not have contributed to the outcome of Federal
Communications Commission v. Fox. For example, the Justices' predecision conference or the ability of the Justices to print and circulate drafts
of opinions might have led to a decision focusing exclusively on the
arbitrary and capricious question rather than the underlying First
Amendment qusio.' Where the institutional model falls short, however,
is that it cannot explain how the Justices' actions, which were seemingly
influenced by the institutional characteristics of the Court, do not more
105.
106.
107.
108.

Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 239.
Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 451 (2d Cir. 2007).
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21 (1971).
See Gillman, supra note 87, at 82.

278

27

~FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS LA WJO URNAL

(o.6 63
[Vol.

accurately reflect strategic or attitudinal motivations. Unlike Gillman's
discussion of Brown v. Board, the Justices here did not seem at all
concerned with preserving the legitimacy of the Court as an institution.
Another problem with the institutional model is that it seems to derive
much of its force from many of the same principles that underlie the legal
model.1 09 It is one thing to say, for example, that the Court is concerned
with preserving its legitimacy. If one believes this to be true, the question
that naturally arises is, "what gives the Court its legitimacy in the first
place?" For many people, it is the belief that the Court decides cases purely
in accordance with the law that accomplishes this task. In other words, it is
those same principles that make up the legal model that lay the foundation
for the institutional model as well. But it is already clear that the legal
model cannot sufficiently explain the outcome of Federal Communications
Commission v. Fox because the arbitrary and capricious review standard is
subject to a variety of applications. Since there is no one clear way to apply
arbitrary and capricious review, the Justices must have relied upon
something more than pure legal analysis. The institutional model,
unfortunately, does not explain what the Court relied upon when it
rendered its five-to-four decision.
B. Getting There? The Strategic Model as a Possible Explanation
for the Outcome of Federal Communications Commission v. Fox
The strategic model comes closer to providing a satisfactory
explanation for the Court's decision in Federal Communications
Commission v. Fox because the decision reflects a conscious choice by the
majority to pursue the procedural arbitrary and capricious question even
though the substantive constitutional question was equally viable. One
possible explanation for this choice is that Chief Justice Roberts was aware
that if the Court tried to answer the First Amendment question, the outcome
would not have been what he wanted. Thus, in an effort to prevent a
decision that would invalidate the FCC's policy, Roberts assigned the
opinion to Justice Scalia, who agreed that the appropriate way to address
the case was to focus exclusively on the arbitrary and capricious question,
despite indicating at oral argument that he did not believe the speech here
deserved constitutional protection.'"0 In order to garner the necessary fourth
and fifth votes to render a binding majority opinion, though, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito knew they had to frame the issue in
part as being the appropriate role of the judiciary when reviewing agency
109. See id at 80 (suggesting that most judges decide actual legal disputes in accordance
with their best understanding of the law).
1 10. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-52, FCC v. Fox TV Stations, 129 S. Ct.
1800 (2009).
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policies. Otherwise, it appears that Justices Thomas and Kennedy would
have reached a different conclusion even though they were quick to agree
that, while the FC's policy was perhaps misguided, it was not arbitrary or
capricious."
Consistent with Epstein and Knight's account of the strategic model,
Federal Communications Commission v. Fox can be interpreted as an
example of interdependent judicial decision making. The outcome was
contingent upon not only Chief Justice Roberts's or Justices Scalia's or
Alito's individual attitudes and actions; it also depended upon the attitudes
and actions of the remaining six Justices. If one assumes, then, that Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito wanted to uphold the FCC's
policy, the inquiry those Justices had to undertake was how to do so while
remaining within the institutional contours of the Court. Through initial
conference discussions and the initial predecision vote, it probably
occurred to them that the way to preserve the FCC's policy was to avoid
the constitutional issue altogether and to focus on the question of whether
the Second Circuit erred in finding the policy arbitrary and capricious. One
of Fox's principal arguments before both the Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court was that the FCC's policy was unconstitutional.'" 2 That the
majority of the Court entirely failed to address that question reflects
strategic decision making on behalf of some of the Justices.
The strategic model also might explain how a minority of the Court
was able to reach the outcome it wanted when it appears that a majority of
the Court believed the policy to be unduly intrusive on broadcasters' First
Amendment freedoms. As some scholars have argued, "at the heart of the
decision-making process are policy-oriented justices who employ a
'mixture of appeals, threats, and offers to compromise' to encourage their
3
colleagues to support legal rulings that reflect their policy preferences."'"
This apparent bargaining could explain how a minority of the Court was
able to persuade a majority to support its view.
The limit of the strategic model, although not necessarily invalidating,
is that the model can be understood only if one assumes that Justices seek
to implement legal policies that reflect their individual goals. Since goaloriented Justices are influenced most by their individual or personal
attitudes, it is difficult to explain the Justices' strategic behavior without
I111. See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819-21 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
112. Brief for Respondent Fox TV Stations, Inc. at 42, FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (No. 07-582).
113. James F. Spriggs, 11, Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahibeck, Bargainingon the US.
Supreme Court: Justices' Responses to Majority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POLITICS 485, 486
(1999) (citation omitted) (quoting
42 (1973)).
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first understanding the Justices' individual attitudes. Thus, while the
strategic model might indeed provide some insight into the outcome of
Federal Communications Commission v. Fox, it seems that any strategic
behavior ultimately cannot be separated from the individual attitudes that
motivated the Justices' strategic behavior in the first place.

C.

Attitudinalism-The Proven Model Proves Itself Again

That being said, the attitudinal model of judicial decision making
provides the best explanation for the Justices' behavior. If one considers
simply the outcome of the case and not the alleged justification-that is,
that the Court upheld the FCC's policy-the Justices reached a seemingly
conservative result to the extent that the outcome favored the government.
Not only that, but the actual opinion was split by a five-to-four vote, almost
perfectly along ideological lines. As Alexander Tahk and Stephen Jessee
indicate, along the ideological spectrum, Justice Thomas is far to the right,
Justice Scalia is far to the right, Justice Kennedy is slightly to the right,
4
Chief Justice Roberts is to the right, and Justice Alito is to the right."1
Together, those five Justices make up the conservative block on the
Court."' On the other side of the spectrum are Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Stevens, and Souter, who represent the liberal blc.H6 It is, therefore, no
coincidence that the majority opinion reflects the views of the conservative
Justices who comprise the majority of the Court.
Given Justice Thomas's and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinions,
along with the dissenting opinions, it seems that if the Court had addressed
the First Amendment issue, the outcome of the case might have come out
in favor of the broadcasters.' ~But it is curious as to how the Court could
reach two separate outcomes regarding the same case. In other words, if the
attitudinal model is truly capable of explaining the outcome of the case,
then the Justices' attitudes cannot be limited to only substantive issues.
As Harold Spaeth intimated, many scholars believe that attitudes
extend not only to substantive issues, but to other issues such as judicial
restraint and strict construction."18 It is entirely possible, then, that the
outcome of Federal Communications Commission v. Fox represents the
Justices' attitudes on the appropriate role of the Court when reviewing
administrative agencies' policy determinations and not the Justices' views
114. See Alexander Tahk & Stephen Jessee, Current Beliefs, SUPREME
http://sct.tahk.us/current.htmld (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).

COURT IDEOLOGY

PROJECT,

115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 18 19-22 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); id at 1822-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id at 1824-28 (Stevens, I.,
dissenting); id. at 1828-29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id at 1829-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. See Spaeth, supranote 60, at 305.
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on the First Amendment. Such a distinction nicely explains Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion in which he said, "I join the Court's opinion,
which, as a matter of administrative law, correctly upholds the Federal
Communications Commission's (FCC) policy with respect to indecent
broadcast speech under the Administrative Procedure Act."' 19 Thomas's
opinion indicates that his attitude toward the Court's role in reviewing
agency decisions is one of deference, which required him to find for the
FCC unless the decision was so untenable as to render it arbitrary and
capricious. Yet, while it appears Justice Thomas was motivated by his
attitude toward judicial review of agency determinations, the other Justices
might have been motivated by their attitudes toward the arbitrary and
capricious review standard or toward the underlying First Amendment
issue. Since judicial attitudes are not confined to either substantive or
procedural matters, the attitudinal model best explains the outcome of
Federal Communications Commission v. Fox.
D. Why It All Matters-Implicationsof the Finding that
Attitudinalism PredominatesJudicialDecision Making
What follows from this result is that the outcome of a given case often
depends on who is occupying the seats on the bench. When the Court
experiences a change in personnel, the potential outcome of various cases
can change, especially cases that would otherwise be closely split. Since
the Court recently experienced a personnel change, with Justice Sotomayor
replacing Justice Souter and Justice Kagan replacing Justice Stevens, it is
important to consider how the fleeting expletives issue might be affected.
On one hand, it is entirely possible that with Sotomayor and Kagan
replacing two of the dissenting Justices, there will be no resulting shift in
doctrine on the issue of fleeting expletives. Because the Court is more
likely to see a constitutional challenge the next time it hears a fleeting
expletives case, though, it is at least worthwhile to consider how the
addition of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan to the Court might affect the
outcome with respect to the First Amendment issue, especially in light of
Thomas's concurring opinion and the dissenting opinions.
V. JUSTICE SONIA SOTOMAYOR'S FIRST AMENDMENT RECORD
ON THE COURT OF APPEALS AND OTHER SIGNS OF HER
ATTITUDE TOWARD) THE FIRST AMENDMENT
More often than not, a Supreme Court Justice's attitudes will reflect
20
to some extent the attitudes of the President who appointed him or her.1
FCC v. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1819 (Thomas J., concurring) (emphasis added).
120. DENTS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31989, SUPREME COURT
119.

APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE
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Consequently, because Justice Sonia Sotomayor was appointed by a liberal
president, Barack Obama, one might reasonably expect her (and possibly
Kagan121 ) to take a liberal stance on issues of great concern such as the
First Amendment. "In issues pertaining to . .. [the] First Amendment,.... a
case is classified as liberal if the outcome favored . .. the civil liberties or
civil rights claimant .
* ,,122 A close review of the decisions then-Judge
Sotomayor issued while on the Second Circuit reveals that her First
Amendment record is somewhat mixed.12 3 Many times, she upheld First
Amendment challenges to government regulations.12 4 Yet, on other
occasions, she authored opinions that many First Amendment advocates
2
found alarming.1 1

A.

Sotomayor 's JudicialRecord on FirstAmendment Issues

Probably her most high-profile First Amendment decision came in
26
United States v. Quattrone.1
In that case, Judge Sotomayor invalidated the
decision of the lower court, which had issued a gag order to prevent the
press from revealing the names of any prospective or selected jurors in the
trial of Credit Suisse First Boston executive Frank Quattrone.12 1 In her
decision, Judge Sotomayor wrote:
A judicial order forbidding the publication of information disclosed in
a public judicial proceeding collides with two basic First Amendment
protections: the right against prior restraints on speech and the right to
report freely on events that transpire in an open courtroom. Because
nothing in this case justified the district court's infringement of these
two central freedoms, we hold that the court's order violated
the Free
28
Speech and Free Press clauses of the First Amendment.'
She further explained, "though the district court considered and rejected the
possibility of an anonymous jury, the record does not demonstrate
sufficient consideration of measures other than a prior restraint that could
(2010).
121. At the time of publication, Elena Kagan's Segal-Cover score was not available. As
this Note focuses on judicial decision making, the discussion of Kagan's potential liberal
lean based on her appointment by a liberal president is beyond the scope of this discussion.
See infra note 150, and accompanying text.
122. Lee Epstein et. al, The Supreme Court During Crisis. How War Affects Only NonWar Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 44 (2005).
123. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Sotomayor on the First Amendment, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER (May 28, 2009), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?2 1629.
124. See id.
125. See Ronald K. L. Collins, Sotomayor and Free Expression, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER
(May
28,
2009).
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
commentary.aspx?id=2 1637.
126. 402 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 2005).
127. See id.
128. Id. at 308.
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have mitigated the effects of the perceived harm."' 29 Thus, because of the
court's special disdain for prior restraints, and because the district court
failed to consider alternative mechanisms for reducing the alleged harm,
Judge Sotomayor invalidated the gag order.
In another case involving a different type of gag order, Judge
Sotomayor authored an opinion that rejected a number of constitutional
challenges to a rule prohibiting overseas organizations that receive U.S.
funds from providing abortion services.'130 Re lying upon Second Circuit
and Supreme Court precedent, Judge Sotomnayor reiterated, "the
government is within its constitutional authority in imposing restrictions or
conditions on the receipt of USAID funding by [foreign NGOs]." 3
Because domestic NGOs were free to use their own funds to pursue their
32
endeavors, no First Amendment violation had occurred.1
In the context of protest demonstrations, Judge Sotomayor, in
Papineau v. Parmley, determined that people have a right to express their
views through protest, and "the police may not interfere with
demonstrations unless there is a 'clear and present danger' of riot,
imminent violence, interference with traffic or other immediate threat to
public safety."'13 3 Sotomayor continued, "on the facts alleged, we cannot
say as a matter of law that the police had an objectively reasonable basis to
conclude that the plaintiffs presented a clear and present danger of
imminent harm or other threat to the public at the time of the arrests." 3 By
forcefully arresting the protestors in the absence of any reasonable belief
that their actions would result in some sort of public harm, the police
officers violated the First Amendment.
As a federal district judge in Campos v. Coughlin, Judge Sotomayor
addressed the question of whether a prison could, consistently with the
First Amendment, prevent prisoners from wearing particular religious
artifacts such as religious beads.135 She declared:
and I
While I defer to defendants' assessment of the gang situation. ...
accept defendants' assertions that beads are gang identifiers...
[d]efendants have not shown how the directive, which prohibits the
wearing of beads even under clothing, 36furthers the state's compelling
interest in the least restrictive manner."'1
129. Id. at 311.
130. Ctr. for Reprod. Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2002).
131. Id. at 192 (quoting Ctr. For Reprod. Law & Policy v. Bush, No. 01 CIV.
4986(LAP), 2001 WL 868007, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 200 1)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. atl190.
133. Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 57 (2d. Cir. 2006) (quoting Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 3 10 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1940)).
134. Id. at 60.
135. 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
136. Id. at 207-08.
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Finding in favor of the prisoners, Judge Sotomayor went on to say that
allowing the prisoners to wear their beads under clothing would indeed
address the defendants' concerns while still preserving the free exercise of
religion.
One of Judge Sotomayor's most troubling votes, according to First
Amendment scholar Ronald K. L. Collins, 31occurred in oninger v.
Niehoff.3 1 In that case, which involved a student's online blog entry
criticizing the principal, the Second Circuit decided that students' First
Amendment freedoms are limited, even if the speech occurs off school
grounds, to the extent that such speech could substantially disrupt the
school environment. 13 9 Purporting to rely upon the Supreme Court's
precedent in Tinker,140 and the Second Circuit's precedent in Wisniewski v.
Board of Education,14 1 the court in Doninger found that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the student's blog could cause a substantial disruption
because of the particularly offensive language she used in the blog, the
misleading information contained therein, and the blogger's unique
position as a leader in the student government.14 2 The result of the decision,
as Collins suggests, was a ratcheting down of First Amendment freedoms
any time it is "reasonably foreseeable" that their expression could result in
"any disruption, however insubstantial or however caused."'14 3
The foregoing decisions reflect only a small subset of the cases
implicating the First Amendment with which now-Justice Sotomayor has
been involved. They do nevertheless demonstrate Justice Sotomayor's
seemingly inconsistent views on the First Amendment. Yet to conclude,
based on these opinions, that Justice Sotomayor actually holds inconsistent
views on the First Amendment would be overly simplistic.
Drawing on Spaeth's observations regarding the attitudinal model, a
Justice's attitudes can encompass normative issues such as judicial restraint
and strict construction. 1 44 Consistent with that idea, Collins summarizes
Justice Sotomayor's record nicely:
What her Quattrone, Papineau and Campos opinions [in particular]
reveal is a judge disposed to deciding cases on the narrowest grounds
with careful scrutiny of the facts. There is nothing bold in her opinions,
no "big picture" dicta about the jurisprudence of prior restraints or
freedom of assembly or prisoner rights and the First Amendment.

137. Collins, supra note 125.
138. 527 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 2008).
139. See id. at 48.
140. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
141. 494 F.3d 34 (2d. Cir. 2007).
142. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48-53.
143. Collins, supra note 125 (emphasis in original).
144. See SEGAL & SPAETHI, supra note 47, and accompanying text.
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Quattrone, Papineau and Campos show the guarded mind of a jurist

more in line with incremental context-based thinking than with, say the
broad sweep jurisprudence of a Hugo Black or William Brennan.
Nonetheless, they also reveal the mind of someone who seems to45take
First Amendment tests seriously enough to apply them rigorously.1
What emerges, then, is a clear picture of Justice Sotomayor's attitude
regarding normative, rather than substantive, issues. One might conclude
that her decision making follows a straightforward formula. Precedent and
established doctrine control to the extent possible, but when a case does not
fit within the preexisting framework, she will draw upon her attitudes
toward substantive issues.
In the fleeting expletives context, prior precedent and general First
Amendment jurisprudence would seemingly have led Justice Sotomayor to
agree with the dissenters. In other words, it appears that Justice Sotomayor
would agree with the initial FCC determination that because the use of
fleeting expletives does not satisfy any categorical or First Amendment
balancing analysis already established by Supreme Court doctrine, the use
of fleeting expletives is beyond the scope of First Amendment indecency
regulation.
Some scholars might contend, however, that any predictive quality of
a judge's record on the court of appeals is somewhat skewed.146 Judges at
the court of appeals operate in a different context than the Supreme Court
because they must be mindful that a wrongly decided case will be
overturned.14 7 Thus, while Justice Sotomayor's record might provide a
glimpse into her judicial attitudes, her record is not necessarily dispositive
48
of how she would decide a First Amendment case on the Supreme Court.1

B. Additional Indicationsof Sotomayor 's View of the First
Amendment
Even if one discards Justice Sotomayor's record as a court of appeals
judge as incapable of predicting her judicial attitudes toward the First
Amendment, there are other indications that she would be sympathetic to
First Amendment challenges to government regulations. First, as
previously mentioned, a Supreme Court Justice's attitudes often reflect the

145. Collins, supra note 125.
146. Spaeth,supra note 60, at 313.
147. Id.
148. Yet, some scholars suggest that judicial attitudes about important issues emerge
even at the court of appeals level. See Sunstein et al., supra note 72, at 302-06. Thus, one
could infer that if judicial attitudes toward ideological issues can indeed affect the outcome
of court of appeals cases, then the lack of expression of such attitudes might suggest a
judicial attitude encompassing normative issues such as judicial restraint and strict
construction.
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attitudes of his or her appointing president. 149 Since Justice Sotomayor's
appointer, President Barack Obama, is known as a reliable liberal, one
could reasonably expect Justice Sotomayor to take a similar stance on First
Amendment cases, meaning she would most likely favor the party
contending that speech has been constrained.
Additional evidence that Sotomayor might hold liberal attitudes can
be elicited from the endorsements she received from major newspapers.
This analysis, named the Segal-Cover score after its creators, Jeffrey Segal
and Albert Cover,o50 evaluates newspaper editorials from four of the most
prominent newspapers in America: the New York Times, the Wall Street
Journal, the Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times."' The SegalCover score characterizes the nominees prior to their confirmation as
liberal or conservative on civil rights and liberties issues.15 2 Although this
analysis is somewhat premature at this point, Jeffrey Segal predicts that
Sotomayor's score will define her as a moderate liberal,153 again suggesting
that she would be more inclined to favor the party bringing the First
Amendment challenge.

C. The Remaining Justices'Attitudes on the FleetingExpletives
Issue
Since Justice Stevens's retirement, the composition of the Court is
again in flux, leading to additional questions about the Court's future
ideological leaning. Stevens's replacement, Elena Kagan, adds to the
mystique because she is difficult to categorize. Although it is true that as
Solicitor General, she argued in favor of seemingly broad laws curbing the
freedom of expression, it is important to remember that her role as an
advocate was very different than her future role as a Justice on the Supreme
Court.154 As a result, some scholars suggest that to better understand Justice
Kagan's ideological attitudes, it is best to consider the articles she authored

149. See RuTKus, supra note 120, at 8-9.
150. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme CourtJustices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 557 (1989).
151. Seeid.at557-59.
152. Id.
153. Amy Harder, Keeping Score on Sotomayor, NATIONALJOURNAL.COM (June 12,
2009, 4:15 PM), http://ninthjustice.nationaljoumal.com/2009/06/if-confirmed-soniasotomayor-w.php.
154. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Kagan's First Amendment Record Causes Concern,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (MAY 10, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
commentary.aspx?id=22934&printer-friendly-y. See also David L. Hudson, Jr., SolicitorGeneralNominee: Impressive First Amendment Resume, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Jan.
[hereinafter
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspz?id=21093
8, 2009),

Solicitor-GeneralNominee].
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as an academic.'" A cursory review of her work reveals a very illuminated
mind and a very thorough understanding of the First Amendment, but no
clear ideological preferences.15 6 One is, therefore, left to speculate about
how Justice Kagan might vote in a case involving a First Amendment
challenge to the FCC's new policy.
Nevertheless, it appears that if Justice Sotomayor votes the same way
as her predecessor, the Court will be able to command a majority for
overturning the policy on First Amendment grounds. Justice Ginsburg's
dissenting opinion chiding the effect of the FCC's policy on the First
Amendment indicates that she most likely believes the policy is
unconstitutional.157 Justice Breyer, revealing his own recognition of a First
Amendment problem, added, "[o]f course, nothing in the Court's decision
today prevents the Commission from reconsidering its current policy in
. . ,,5 Even Justice
light of potential constitutional considerations
Thomas's concurring opinion suggests that the Court needs to reevaluate its
precedent concerning the use of expletives on the public airwaves. 159
Primarily, Justice Thomas asserted that the facts underlying the Court's
leading precedent in Red Lion 160 and Pacifica'6 1-that is, that the broadcast
spectrum was limited, that broadcast media was uniquely intrusive, and that
it was easily accessible to children-have changed to such a degree that
162
broadcast media no longer deserve the unique disfavor it once suffered.
As a result, it seems that based on Justice Sotomayor's First
Amendment jurisprudence and other indications of her judicial attitude
toward the First Amendment, in addition to the apparent attitudes of the
remaining Justices, the Court should be able to command a majority for
overturning the FCC's current policy on fleeting expletives. But the
implications of this finding extend beyond the issue of fleeting expletives.
With the recent addition of Justice Kagan, the Court's eased approach
toward indecency regulation in the context of television broadcasts might
very well extend to other forms of media regulation as well.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF FLEETING EXPLETIVES
BASED ON THE CURRENT COMPOSITION OF THE COURT
In the Supreme Court's recent decision in Federal Communications
155. Solicitor-GeneralNominee, supra note 154.
156. See id.
157. See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, 129 SC. 1800, 1828-29 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
158. Id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 1820-22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
160. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
161. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
162. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox, 129 S.Ct. at 1821-22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Commission v. Fox, the Court approved a new FCC policy that now allows
fines and other sorts of punishment for fleeting or isolated use of expletives
on public television broadcasts. In its brief, Fox made two primary
arguments: first, the FCC' s new policy was arbitrary and capricious under
the APA, and second, the policy was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. Like the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court opted to bypass
the constitutional question, and instead determined on the basis of the APA
that the new policy was entirely rational and therefore legally justified.
Because of the lingering First Amendment issue, however, it appears this
saga has not yet seen its end.
Thus, with the hope of predicting what might happen if the Court
addresses the First Amendment question, this Note considered four
dominant models of judicial decision making-the legal model, the
attitudinal model, the strategic model, and the historic-institutional
model-and analyzed FederalCommunications Commission v. Fox in light
of those models to help understand how the Justices reached their
decisions. What emerged was a clear example of attitudinal decision
making. In other words, it appears that the Justices were mostly influenced
by their individual attitudes or personal ideologies when they cast their
votes. The implication of this finding is that the outcome of a constitutional
inquiry regarding the fleeting expletives issue will depend upon the
individual Justices who occupy the seats on the bench.
With Justice Sotomayor recently replacing Justice Souter, this Note
evaluated not only Justice Sotomayor' s ostensible attitude toward the First
Amendment, but also the ostensible attitudes of the remaining Justices in
order to try to determine how the current composition of the Court might
influence the outcome of this issue. In short, it appears that in the event a
First Amendment challenge is brought before the Supreme Court, a clear
majority, including Justice Sotomayor, will likely rule in favor of the
broadcasters, thereby invalidating the FCC's new policy. It is important to
note that the ramifications of this case could well extend to other areas of
media regulation. Thus, the Court may be on the brink of an entirely new
approach toward the First Amendment in the field of communications law
generally.

